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Abstract— Network coding (NC)-enabled mobile small cells are
observed as a promising technology for fifth-generation (5G)
networks that can cover the urban landscape by being set up on-
demand at any place and at any time on any device. Nevertheless,
despite the significant benefits that this technology brings to the
5G of mobile networks, major security issues arise due to the fact
that NC-enabled mobile small cells are susceptible to pollution
attacks; a severe security threat exploiting the inherent vulner-
abilities of NC. Therefore, intrusion detection and prevention
mechanisms to detect and mitigate pollution attacks are of utmost
importance so that NC-enabled mobile small cells can reach their
full potential. Thus, in this article, we propose for the first time,
to the best of our knowledge, a novel intrusion detection and
prevention scheme (IDPS) for NC-enabled mobile small cells. The
proposed scheme is based on a null space-based homomorphic
message authentication code (MAC) scheme that allows detection
of pollution attacks and takes proper risk mitigation actions when
an intrusive incident is detected. The proposed scheme has been
implemented in Kodo and its performance has been evaluated in
terms of computational overhead.
Index Terms— Fifth generation (5G), homomorphic message
authentication codes (MACs), intrusion detection and prevention,
mobile small cells, pollution attacks, random linear network
coding (RLNC).
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE fifth generation (5G) of mobile communications isexpected to provide a connected society [1]–[4]. The
small cell technology is one of the major 5G enablers for
effective provision of 5G services in an energy-efficient and
cost-effective way [5], [6]. It is shown that the network cod-
ing (NC) technology, due to power consumption, packet loss,
and low communication bandwidth, can be a good solution
for increasing the throughput and improving the performance
of the wireless network in mobile small cells [7]. Unlike the
traditional store-and-forward routing in NC-enabled, the infor-
mation flow can be mixed. In addition, there are two main
approaches of NC: XOR NC and random linear NC (RLNC)
(see Fig. 1). NC can provide essential benefits to networks
such as: 1) reduction packet transmission in wireless multicast
[8], [9]; 2) improving the network capacity [10]; and 3) gain
robustness to packet losses [11] and low energy consump-
tion [12]. However, despite the outstanding benefits of NC
technology, NC-enabled wireless networks are susceptible to
pollution attacks, a security threat, where a malicious node
injects corrupted packets into the network that makes desti-
nation nodes unable to decode the native packets correctly
[13], [14]. The impact of this type of attack is devastating
as they lead not only to network resource waste but also
to energy waste on the nodes. Based on that the security is
a significant factor for the success of 5G technology, novel
intrusion detection and prevention scheme (IDPS) against
these kinds of attacks in the NC-enabled mobile small cells are
needed [15]–[19].
Therefore, in this article, we propose for the first time, to
the best of our knowledge, a novel IDPS for NC-enabled
mobile small cells. The proposed scheme is based on a
null space-based homomorphic message authentication code
(MAC) scheme that allows the detection of pollution attacks
and takes proper risk mitigation actions when an intrusive inci-
dent is detected. The proposed scheme has been implemented
in Kodo and its performance has been evaluated in terms of
computational overhead.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section II,
we provide the background and related work of NC tech-
nology, secure NC, and security schemes against pollution
attacks in NC-enabled networks. The scenario architecture is
presented in Section III. In Section IV, the detailed description
of the proposed novel IDPS for NC-enabled mobile small cells
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Fig. 1. (a) XOR NC based on the butterfly topology. b) RLNC based on the butterfly topology.
is given. In Section V, we provide details of the implementa-
tion of the proposed scheme in Kodo. In Section VI, we pro-
vide the performance evaluation of the proposed scheme.
Finally, Section VII concludes this article.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Mobile Small Cell in 5G Mobile Networks
New IT technologies, such as the Internet of Things,
network resource sharing, network functions virtualization
(NFV), software-defined networking (SDN), and NC can reach
their high potential by evolving 5G wireless communications.
Furthermore, recent research studies have shown that these
technologies have the potential to make 5G networks more
efficient and less costly [20]. However, recent research studies
have identified a few limitations of 5G technology as well. The
main limitations include data speed, latency, and reliability.
In order to address these limitations of 5G communications,
the small cell technology is one of the good solutions. The
use of small cell concept provides benefits, including higher
capacity, less transmission power, local interference only,
and robustness [21]. Nevertheless, the small cell technology
introduces new challenges such as complex infrastructure and
high handover. In other words, the 5G small cells can play an
essential role in order to provide 5G networks with densely
deployed heterogeneous networks with increasing demand
for capacity. In particular, 5G small cells will be enhanced
by incorporating techniques related to massive aggregation,
intercell interference mitigation, multicell coordination, new
coding, and modulation [22], [23]. In this regard, given the
fact that we employ NC to form new energy-efficient and
high-speed networking for mobile small cells, a bunch of
security challenges have appeared and they are needed to
be addressed. As an example, Ferrag et al. [24] provide
a survey on privacy-preserving and authentication schemes
for 5G networks derived from 50 articles. The authors also
provide a classification for the attacks in 5G environment.
In addition, a classification of countermeasures to mitigate the
classified attacks is summarized. This classification is based
on cryptographic methods, intrusion detection methods, and
human factors [24].
B. Secure NC
By using the NC protocol, several security attacks, including
eavesdropping attacks and pollution attacks, in NC-enabled
mobile small cells have appeared recently.
Many secure NC schemes against pollution attacks have
been proposed. Based on homomorphic functions, a security
hashing scheme was proposed by Krohn et al. [25], where
the generated hashes are responsible to validate blocks of
rate-less codes. Moreover, a cooperative scheme where legal
nodes collaborate to preserve themselves against adversary
nodes is presented in [26]. In this scheme, the cooperation
between the nodes enables them to detect and verify mali-
cious nodes. Finally, in multicast RLNC-enabled networks,
Ho et al. [27] proposed an approach for detecting byzantine
attacks. More precisely, the proposed approach first tries to
calculate a polynomial function of the data symbols (hash).
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Fig. 2. External attack scenario in the butterfly topology.
Fig. 3. Byzantine modification attack scenario in the butterfly topology.
Then, it augments each source packet with a flexible number
of hash symbols calculated earlier.
C. Pollution Attacks
Pollution attacks can be launched by either an external
adversary or an internal adversary (i.e., byzantine modification
attacks). In the case of an external adversary, as shown in
Fig. 2, the adversary injects corrupted packets into the network
in order to corrupt other coded packets and disrupts the
routing operation. However, the main effort of an adversary
in byzantine modification attack is to execute some changes
(i.e., wrong coding operations) to data in transition and threat
the integrity of the packets in the networks [14], [23], [24] (see
Fig. 3). Both these types of attackers can also be considered
as data pollution attacks and tag pollution attacks, as shown
in Figs. 2 and 3. In particular, the main target of an adversary
in data pollution attacks is to modify (i.e., corrupt) the trans-
mitted data packet, and in tag pollution attacks, the adversary
aims to modify the tags appended to the end of data packets.
D. Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
IDPSs are mainly focused on identifying potential security
incidents and on blocking or preventing detected the malicious
activity. Regarding malicious activity detection, IDPSs use
signature detection to identify the known malicious behav-
ior or anomaly detection to identify behavior that is not related
to legitimate users [30]–[33].
Signature detection is based on a set of known malicious
data patterns that are also referred to as signatures. These sig-
natures are compared with current behavior to decide whether
the current behavior is a malicious one or not. This method
of detection is suitable for detecting only known attacks.
On the other hand, anomaly detection is based on data
related to normal behavior (i.e., profiles) and derived from
monitoring the characteristics of legitimate activity on the
system or in the network over a period. Then, the anomaly
detection is carried out by analyzing definitions of what action
is supposed normal (i.e., created normal behavior profiles)
against recognized events in order to identify meaningful
deviations, which imply malicious activity. In the anomaly
detection process, the profiles can either be static or dynamic.
Next, a static profile does not change until the IDPS is forced
to create a new profile. On the contrary, a dynamic profile is
adjusted continuously as extra events are observed. In fact,
based on the fact that systems and networks change over
time, the corresponding measures of normal behavior also
change. Therefore, static profiles become inaccurate over time,
and thus, they should be periodically regenerated. However,
although dynamic profiles do not have this issue, they are
vulnerable to evasion attempts from attackers. Furthermore,
it is worthwhile to mention that in contrast to signature
detection, anomaly detection is very strong at identifying
unknown attacks. Nevertheless, anomaly-based techniques are
characterized by a high false alarm rate due to the fact that
1470 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS, VOL. 6, NO. 6, DECEMBER 2019
Fig. 4. Scenario architecture of SECRET.
previously unseen normal system/network behaviors may be
categorized as anomalies.
III. SCENARIO ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we provide the scenario architecture
of the EU-funded H2020-MSCA project “SECRET” (see
Fig. 4), which is focused on secure NC-enabled mobile small
cells [34]. This scenario architecture consists of a macrocell
including a number of small cells that are controlled by a
cluster head (i.e., hotspot). The hotspot is a mobile device
(i.e., mobile node) within the identified cluster of mobile
devices, which is nominated to play the role of the local
radio manager to control and maintain the cluster. Moreover,
the hotspots of different clusters cooperate to form a wireless
network of mobile small cells that have several gateways/entry
points to the mobile network using intelligent high-speed
connections. It is worthwhile to mention that a centralized
software-defined controller controls the hotspots of the dif-
ferent clusters. Finally, the data communication between the
mobile nodes is established through device-to-device (D2D)
communications and optimized by NC technology. In par-
ticular, in the studied scenario, it is assumed that a source
mobile node (SN), locating at a mobile small cell, wants
to multicast packets to two destination mobile nodes (DNs),
locating at another mobile small cell. Thus, packets from the
SN are coded (i.e., RLNC) and traverse multiple devices,
over a multihop D2D network, before arriving at the DNs,
where they are decoded. The multihop D2D network consists
of several user equipments (UEs), such as legitimate mobile
nodes and relay mobile nodes (RNs), as depicted in Fig. 4.
IV. NOVEL IDPS FOR NC-ENABLED
MOBILE SMALL CELLS
In this section, we present our proposed IDPS for
NC-enabled mobile small cells. Our IDPS is based on a
null space-based homomorphic message authentication code
(MAC) scheme proposed in [15] and allows the detection
of pollution attacks and takes proper risk mitigation actions
when an intrusive incident is detected. The focus of our IDPS
is on the detection and mitigation of pollution attacks that
comprise a severe threat in NC-enabled networks as their
impact is similar to the impact of denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks and network resource waste and energy waste at the
nodes. In fact, the attacker targets the availability of the NC-
enabled network and its nodes [16], [28]. The adopted scheme
from our previous work in [15] enables the proposed IDPS
to detect pollution attacks by checking (i.e., verifying) the
orthogonality of the packets with tags and keys as described in
the following. In case that the verification result is not equal
to zero (i.e., detection of polluted packet), the packet will be
dropped (i.e., prevention from pollution).
A. Outline of the IDPS Scheme
First, the source node divides each message into a sequence
of native packets and partitions them into generations.
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Following our assumption in [15], each generation consists
of p messages packets denoted as c1, c2, L, c p . We assume
that each packet ci is represented as a vector of q symbols
[e.g., (ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,q )] in which each symbol stands in the
finite field FqS , where S is the finite field size. Consequently,
the source node generates an augmented packet ci
ci = (
p︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
ì−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0, ci,1, . . . , ci,q ) ∈ F p+qS . (1)
Then, the source node sends ci to its neighbor nodes. During
transmission, an intermediate node creates a new coded packet
ci . In our proposed IDPS scheme, we have considered that
the source node generates w tags that are based on null space
properties [35]. We define the following four steps.
1) Tag Generation: In this step, first, a key distribution
center (KDC) delivers w key vectors X1, X2, . . . , Xw to the
source node. The size of each key vector is given by the finite
field F p+q+wS . Then, the source node uses these w key vectors
X1, X2, . . . , Xw to calculate w tags for each coded packet.
Furthermore, the source node appends the w tags to the end
of the coded packet ci . The following formula is used in order
to calculate the w tags:
⎡
⎣ X1,1 . . . X1,p+q: : :
















⎣ X1,p+q+1 . . . X1,p+q+w: : :















2) Swapping Process: In this step, we use the swapping
technique in order to avoid tag pollution attacks. In this regard,
the KDC generates a secret positive integer value SV that is
the swapping vector. In addition, the secret value SV is sent
to the source node and destination nodes. Then, the w tag
symbols of the coded packet ci are swapped with w out of
the q symbols of the coded packet ci . Finally, a swapped
coded packet ci is made by the source node with the swapping
process and is represented by the following equation:
ci = Swap(ci )SV. (3)
At the destination side, the nodes have to proceed an inverse
swapping in order to obtain the native packet before the RLNC
decoding takes place.
3) Key Distribution Process: The KDC, based on SV
mentioned in the swapping step, generates new key vectors
X ′1, X ′2, . . . , X ′w. More precisely, each key vector is given by
X ′i = Swap(Xi )SV. (4)
Our proposed IDPS mechanism follows the key distribution
model proposed in [36], which is based on the cover free set
systems. The KDC of our scheme adopts a key distribution
model, based on the cover free set systems [37], in order to
provide resistance against c compromised nodes. In this model,
the maximum number of key vectors that should be assigned to
each intermediate and destination node cannot be more than
R = e ∗ ln(1/q), where q is a security parameter (usually
q = 10−3). In our proposed scheme, this assumption is satis-
fied since only one key vector is required to be assigned by the
KDC to each intermediate and destination node. This is why
each key vector is orthogonal to the swapped coded packet,
and thus, the intermediate and destination nodes require only
one key vector to verify the swapped coded packet.
4) Verification Process: The following formula verifies if a
key vector X ′i is orthogonal to a swapped coded packet ci
η = Swap(Xi )SV ∗ Swap(ci )SV =
p+q+w∑
j=1
X ′i, j ∗ ci, j . (5)
If η = 0, then our proposed IDPS accepts the swapped
coded packet ci and transmits it to the next non-source nodes.
If η = 0, our IDPS discards the coded packet ci .
B. Correctness
The correctness of our IDPS mechanism is proved by
contradiction. In this regard, we consider that our IDPS is not
correct. In the case that this is true, through the verification
step, we should get η = 0 [from (5)]. Then, we assume that
a source node has a coded packet Ri = (Ri1, . . . , Rip+q ) and
w key vectors (X = X1, X2, . . . , X L). Afterward, it starts
generating the w tags t i = (t i1, . . . , t iw) according to (2). For






⎣ X1,1 . . . X1,p+q+1 . . . X1,p+q+w . . . X1,p+1 . . . K1,p+w:





Ri1 . . . t
i
1 . . . t
i
w . . . R
i




⎣ X1,1 ∗ R
i
1 + . . . X1,p+q+w ∗ t iw:





Nevertheless, R̄i = [Ri1, . . . , Rip+q , t i1, . . . , t iw] is orthogo-
nal to each of the w key vectors based on (2). Therefore,




⎣ X1,1 . . . X1,p+q+w: : :












⎣ X1,1 ∗ R
i
1 + . . . X1,p+q+w ∗ t iw:















By comparing (6) with (7), we can see that η = 0. However,
it is a contradiction to our original assumption where we had
assumed that η = 0. Therefore, our IDPS is correct.
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Fig. 5. Scenario 1: our IDPS mechanism implementation when pollution attack does not exist.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
To evaluate the performance of the proposed IDPS, we first
implement the butterfly topology where the RLNC approach
is applied. Then, we implement the external attack scenario
(Fig. 2) and the byzantine modification attack scenario (Fig. 3).
Our implementation is based on the recoding library of Kodo,
which allows encoding at the source node, recoding at the
intermediate nodes, and decoding at the destination nodes [38].
Kodo is an open-source NC library, which is used as a
practical open-source library in order to allow researchers
and students to implement NC algorithms. Although Kodo
is based on C++, it allows users familiar with other pro-
gramming languages other than C++ (e.g., C and Python) to
use the library functionality [38]–[41]. Kodo supports various
NC algorithms, e.g., standard RLNC, systematic RLNC, and
sparse RLNC. The Kodo libraries are described in detail
in [19] and [38]. However, due to the limitations of Kodo
to allow customized generation of packets and keys as well
as tag generation, we used MATLAB. Specifically, we used
MATLAB to generate the packets and the required keys of the
source node and to generate the proper tags at the source node
and the intermediate nodes. Then, we included the generated
packets, keys, and tags manually in Kodo.
Throughout the performance measurements, we used a
generation size of 16 symbols. The symbol size is set between
1000 and 10 000 bytes, as shown in Figs. 11–19. As we
mentioned, these packets and the required keys are generated
randomly in MATLAB. The Galois field in use is GF(28)
and we take into consideration that the number of the tags
appended to the end of each coded packet is L, where L
is equal to L = 27, 42, and 54 [41]. We run the whole
implementation process on a 2.7-GHz Core i7 machine with
8 GB of physical memory.
A. Scenarios
Since no attack has not been considered and defined in the
Kodo library yet, we have generated the external attack and
byzantine modification attack in the butterfly topology in order
to evaluate the performance of the proposed IDPS mechanism.
In this regard, we first implemented on Kodo the butterfly
topology without any attacks as shown in Fig. 5. In particular,
Fig. 6 shows the successful decoding of the received coded
packets at the destination nodes.
Fig. 6. Implementation results in the butterfly topology.
Fig. 7. Implementation result when pollution attack occurs.
Then, we considered pollution attacks in the butterfly topol-
ogy, which make the destination nodes unable to decode the
packets successfully (see Fig. 7).
Afterward, we implemented our IDPS mechanism on Kodo
over the butterfly topology and we show that the proposed
scheme can detect and drop the corrupted packets inserted in
the network due to pollution attacks (i.e., external attack and
byzantine modification attack). In addition, our proposed IDPS
mechanism does not bring high computational complexity.
1) Scenario 1: Well-Behaved Network (No Pollution
Attack): We have implemented the proposed IDPS mechanism
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Fig. 8. Scenario 2: our IDPS mechanism implementation when an external attack exists.
Fig. 9. Scenario 3: our IDPS mechanism implementation when the byzantine modification exists.
over the butterfly topology as shown in Fig. 5. Since there is
not any adversary, the destination nodes decode the packets
successfully (see Fig. 6) and the proposed IDPS mechanism
does not detect any corrupted packet.
2) Scenario 2: External Attack: In this scenario, we con-
sider that an external attack is carried out as an attacker
pollutes a coded packet at node UE-1 (see Fig. 8). However,
our proposed IDPS scheme detects and drops the corrupted
packet.
3) Scenario 3: Byzantine Modification Attack: The byzan-
tine modification attack is shown in Fig. 9, where an attacker
inserts a corrupted packet in the network. It is worthwhile to
mention that our proposed IDPS scheme detects and drops the
corrupted packet (Fig. 10).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we have provided the proposed IDPS mech-
anism performance evaluation in terms of computational and
communication overheads as well as successfully decoding
probability.
A. Computational Overhead
Following [42], we take into consideration that the number
of the tags appended to the end of each coded packet is L
(i.e., L = 27, 42, and 54), and the selected Galois fields is
GF(28). In addition, we consider that the symbol size is set
between 1000 and 10 000 bytes.
Fig. 10. Implementation result in scenarios 2 and 3.
The total time Ttotal elapsed from when the packet is
generated to when the packet is verified and decoded at the
destination nodes is given by the following formula:
Ttotal = Tenc + Trec + Tdec + Tver (8)
where Tenc, Tdec, Trec, and Tver are the time for encoding at
the source node, decoding at the destination node, recoding
at each intermediate nodes, and verifying at the intermediate
and destination nodes, respectively. Ttotal, in the first scenario
is illustrated in Fig. 11. Based on the number of tags, this
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Fig. 11. Ttotal for different numbers of tags when pollution attack has not
occurred.
Fig. 12. Ttotal for different numbers of tags when the byzantine fabrication
attack is carried out.
figure includes four curves. As shown, by increasing the
number of tags, Ttotal increases as well.
On the other hand, in scenario 2, Ttotal for different numbers
of tags (e.g., 27, 42, and 54) is shown in Fig. 12. Furthermore,
Ttotal for different numbers of tags (e.g., 27, 42, and 54),
in scenario 3, is shown in Fig. 13. It is worthwhile to mention
that Ttotal in scenario 2 and scenario 3 increases compared
to Ttotal in scenario 1. The reason is that the proposed IDPS
mechanism needs additional time which is required to drop
the corrupted packet.
In addition, the time required by our IDPS scheme to
verify and detect any corrupted packet in the network, for
both scenarios 2 and 3, is presented in Figs. 14 and 15,
respectively. As we can see from these figures, the required
time for different numbers of tags is almost the same and does
not add significant computational overhead to Ttotal.
B. Communication Overhead
To determine the communication overhead of the proposed
IDPS scheme, we consider that the communication time Tcomm
Fig. 13. Ttotal for different numbers of tags when the byzantine modification
attack is carried out.
Fig. 14. Verification time for different numbers of tags when the byzantine
fabrication attack is carried out.
Fig. 15. Verification time for different numbers of tags when the byzantine
modification attack is carried out.
is defined as follows:
Tcomm = Ttotal − Tver. (9)
Figs. 16 and 17 show Tcomm based on different numbers
of tags used in scenario 2 and scenario 3, respectively. Our
results show that Ttotal is almost the same as Tcomm because
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Fig. 16. Communication time for different numbers of tags when the
byzantine fabrication attack is carried out.
Fig. 17. Communication time for different numbers of tags when the
byzantine modification attack is carried out.
Fig. 18. Pr for different numbers of tags when the byzantine fabrication
attack is carried out.
the verification time Tver required by the proposed IDPS
mechanism is negligible.
C. Decoding Probability
We define Pr the probability that a corrupted packet is not
detected in the verification phase. Figs. 18 and 19 show Pr
Fig. 19. Pr for different numbers of tags when the byzantine modification
attack is carried out.
based on three different numbers of tags (27, 42, and 54).
As shown in these figures, Pr is almost 0%. In other words,
in our proposed IDPS mechanism, the adversary does not have
any chance to distribute the corrupted packet in the network
without being detected.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we proposed for the first time, to the best of
our knowledge, a novel IDPS for NC-enabled mobile small
cells. The proposed scheme has been implemented in Kodo
and its performance evaluation has shown that it does not
add significant computational overhead. The proposed scheme
is based on a null space-based homomorphic MAC scheme
that allows the detection of pollution attacks that comprise
a severe security threat in NC-enabled networks. Moreover,
the proposed scheme drops the corrupted packets that are
detected and the adversary does not have any chance to
distribute the corrupted packet in the network without being
detected in order to protect the NC-enabled mobile small cells
from network resource waste and energy waste. However,
it is not enough because the attackers may continue to make
pollution in the next rounds, which can lead to waste of the
network’s throughput. As a future work, we plan to extend
the proposed IDPS into a collaborative IDPS that will also
allow the detection of the source(s) of the pollution attacks
and the localization of the attackers in order to block them
from having access to the network. Also, we plan to enhance
the proposed IDPS in order to support correction of detected
corrupted packets as well.
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